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INTRODUCTION 
Since its creation by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 20101 (“Dodd-Frank” or “Dodd-Frank Act”), the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has been the subject of much debate and con-
troversy, particularly in regards to its relative autonomy compared to that of other 
independent agencies.2 The most significant recent development in this enduring de-
bate came in the form of two judicial opinions in PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial 
                                                                                                                
?  J.D. and M.P.A. candidate, 2019, Indiana University Maurer School of Law and 
Indiana University School of Public & Environmental Affairs; B.A., 2013, Indiana University 
Bloomington.  
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
2. See, e.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Morgan Drexen, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1082 
(C.D. Cal. 2014) (rejecting various challenges to the Dodd-Frank Act’s delegation of powers 
and authority to the CFPB); Michael C. Nissim-Sabat, Capturing This Watchdog? The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Keeping the Special Interests Out of Its House, 40 W.
ST. U. L. REV. 1, 25 (2012) (“Democrats and Republicans fought doggedly at the bill’s incep-
tion—and continue now—because Republicans believe that the Bureau wields too much 
power. For this reason, the Republicans focused their discontent on the director’s position.”); 
Gillian B. White, What Will Happen to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau?,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/court-rules-
consumer-financial-protection-bureaus-structure-is-unconstitutional/503660 [https://perma.cc 
/Q87M-PZE3] (outlining briefly the history of conservatives’ contestation of the CFPB’s 
authority); see also Kevin M. McDonald, Who’s Policing the Financial Cop on the Beat? A 
Call for Judicial Review of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Non-Legislative 
Rules, 35 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2015) (arguing the CFPB issued two legislative rules 
with proper notice and comment period and therefore warranted judicial review). Even before 
the CFPB’s creation in Dodd-Frank, the agency was a source of tension between conservatives 
and consumer advocates; the final legislation and agency power structures marked a 
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Protection Bureau.3 In October 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit held that the CFPB, as an independent agency, was un-
constitutionally structured in violation of Article II of the Constitution.4 In reviewing 
an enforcement action of the CFPB against petitioner PHH Corporation—a mortgage 
lender facing a $109 million order against it—the court ruled against the CFPB and 
vacated the order against PHH on the grounds that the head of the CFPB possessed 
unconstitutionally broad, and seemingly unchecked, statutory authority.5 In February 
2017, however, the en banc court vacated the original panel’s decision and ordered 
a rehearing on the constitutional question to be held in May 2017; on rehearing, the 
court ultimately found the CFPB’s structure constitutionally sound, rejecting nearly 
every argument to the contrary put forth by PHH Corporation.6
Independent agencies traditionally are characterized, and distinguished from their 
executive agency counterparts, by three key features: (1) the agency head is remov-
able “for cause” by the President; (2) they are not required to submit regulations to 
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs; and (3) they are led by a multi-
member commission or board of directors.7 While there is no exact formula or set of 
characteristics that consistently result in an agency being independent (as opposed to 
executive) for-cause removal protection is often considered the primary distinguish-
ing factor.8 The CFPB, however, is unique in that it possesses the first element of a 
head removable for cause by the President,9 but its leadership lies in just one single 
head—currently, acting director Mick Mulvaney—who is neither supported nor 
                                                                                                                
compromise on many fronts between these two competing groups. See Rachel E. Barkow, 
Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 73–
76 (2010).  
3. 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and rehearing granted by No. 15-1177, slip op. 
at 2 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017), remanded by 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Although this de-
velopment and all subsequent history of this case is obviously important for further clarifica-
tion of the validity of the arguments made for or against the CFPB’s constitutionality, for 
purposes of this Note, the ultimate fate and outcome of PHH Corp. and the CFPB in this 
litigation is irrelevant to the argument I pose. Rather, I intend to use the tensions between the 
arguments laid out by the two opinions—particularly the reliance on historical and traditional 
agency forms as a basis for constitutionality—as a starting point for a broader argument about 
agency design policy. 
4. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 8; see also U.S. CONST. art. II (establishing unitary executive 
power). 
5. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 8. 
6. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d 75. 
7. E.g., Barkow, supra note 2, at 15; see also PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 6; Lisa Schultz 
Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 
599, 600 (2010). Two additional statutory requirements commonly associated with independ-
ent agencies include a fixed term requirement (in conjunction with for-cause removal) and a 
bipartisan appointment requirement. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of 
Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 259 (1988). The latter requirement is designed to 
further the political independence of the agency by preventing built-in partisan bias among the 
agency’s decision makers. See id.; Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
8. Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and 
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 781–82 (2013). 
9. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2012) (for-cause removal provision). 
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checked in his decision-making and enforcement authorities by a multimember com-
mission of any kind.10  
This structural uniqueness is precisely what subjected the agency and relevant 
parts of the Dodd-Frank Act to constitutional challenges and review in PHH Corp.,
and the two opinions issued in the case provide thorough examples of the arguments 
for and against the CFPB’s structural constitutionality. The first panel decision in 
October 2016 found the structure to be in clear violation of the Constitution: not only 
does the structure grant the CFPB director “more unilateral authority than any other 
officer in any of the three branches of the U.S. Government, other than the 
President,”11 but it also represents a completely novel and unprecedented agency 
form.12 These departures from traditional federal agency design principles, the court 
reasoned, vested the CFPB head with the ability to engage in arbitrary decision mak-
ing, commit abuses of power, and generally threaten individual liberty.13 On rehear-
ing, however, the en banc court reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the 
CFPB’s organizational structure lacked any constitutional defects based on precedent 
and historical practice, and that the single director was sufficiently accountable to 
and overseen by the executive branch.14  
Debates over the constitutionality of the CFPB are not new, nor are they unique 
to the PHH Corp. decisions; in fact, the very existence of independent agencies as 
an entire category has been heavily debated in legal scholarship,15 especially as the 
proliferation of such agencies increased throughout the twentieth century.16 In re-
gards to the CFPB, there has been discussion of not only specific elements of its 
powers as enumerated by the Dodd-Frank Act—such as its insulation from the other 
                                                                                                                
10. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 6–7. In addition to acting as a check on the decision-making 
powers of an agency official, multimember leadership bodies are meant more generally to 
foster more collaborative decisions than one would expect from an executive agency. See 
Verkuil, supra note 7, at 260 (describing multimember organizations as being designed to 
result in decision making that is “consensual, reflective and pluralistic”). 
11. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 7. 
12. Id. at 6 (“[N]o independent agency exercising substantial executive authority has ever 
been headed by a single person. Until now.”) (emphasis in original).  
13. Id. at 6–7.
14. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 110 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
15. See Susan Bartlett Foote, Independent Agencies Under Attack: A Skeptical View of 
the Importance of the Debate, 1988 DUKE L.J. 223 (summarizing the debates surrounding the 
two related but distinguishable critiques on the constitutionality and function of independent 
agencies); Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA.
L. REV. 1205 (2014) (arguing all independent agencies should instead be executive, led by 
officers who directly answer to, and are removable at will by, the President). Interestingly, the 
second D.C. Circuit opinion also characterized the challenge by PHH Corporation on the 
CFPB’s structure as a challenge to the category of independent agencies as a whole, describing 
PHH’s challenge as a “wholesale attack on independent agencies—whether collectively or 
individually led—that, if accepted, would broadly transform modern government.” PHH 
Corp., 881 F.3d at 80. 
16. The first regulatory commissions and independent agencies were created during the 
Progressive Era of the late nineteenth century, and the creation of many more occurred during 
and after the New Deal. Datla & Revesz, supra note 8, at 770–71.  
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branches of government17 and its funding mechanisms18—but also the convergence 
of all the statutory characteristics that make the agency uniquely independent: broad 
regulatory powers, independence from Congress (by virtue of not needing to rely on 
congressional appropriations for funding), presidential removal powers, and deferent 
judicial review.19 Despite the wealth of commentary on the various individual char-
acteristics of the CFPB, it is rare that any one of those characteristics alone prompts 
a conclusion that the CFPB violates the Constitution; rather, the consensus seems to 
be that it is the combination of all those features that presents constitutional ques-
tions.20  
Given this common sentiment that individual characteristics like for-cause re-
moval protection should not alone give rise to a constitutional conflict, the initial 
PHH Corp. holding and reasoning came as somewhat of a surprise. Rather than 
coming to a similar conclusion that the CFPB is unconstitutional for the “bundle”21
of provisions that provide independence and discretion, the court instead based its 
decision solely on the broad power vested in the single leader,22 and crafted a remedy 
focusing specifically on the removability of the director.23 Citing Free Enterprise 
Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board,24 the court ordered a severance of 
the for-cause protection from the rest of the statute, which would have allowed the 
CFPB to continue operation while essentially being converted into a traditional ex-
ecutive agency.25  
Perhaps more important, at least for purposes of this Note, than the court’s first 
holding hinging on this one isolated characteristic and provision is that the holding 
was reached via an emphasis on the novel and unprecedented nature of the CFPB’s 
                                                                                                                
17. See, e.g., David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters: 
Governmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446, 1487 (2014) 
(noting that the CFPB is “insulated [] from oversight by almost everyone in the federal gov-
ernment”).
18. See, e.g., Charles Kruly, Self-Funding and Agency Independence, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1733 (2013) (commenting on the independence of self-funded agencies generally and 
concluding the CFPB’s status as self-funded is not necessarily problematic).  
19. See Eric Pearson, A Brief Essay on the Constitutionality of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 99, 104–17 (2013).  
20. E.g., id. at 118 (“It is the convergence of these factors rather than any single factor 
that brings the issue of constitutionality to the fore. . . . [T]he question in this context is whether 
the simultaneous presence of all of these immunities makes the CFPB too independent.” (em-
phasis omitted)); Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 17, at 1488 (explaining that provisions for 
for-cause removal protection and a fixed term for an agency headed by a single person are not 
unique to the CFPB, but that the total combination of protections granted in Dodd-Frank do 
create an unmatched uniqueness).  
21. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 17, at 1488.  
22. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated 
and rehearing granted by No. 15-1177, slip op. at 2 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017), remanded by 
881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
23. Id.  
24. 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
25. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 8, 12. The court held that if the CFPB were to remain an 
independent agency, it would need to be structured with leadership in a multimember com-
mission. Id. at 12.  
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leadership structure. Finding “no settled historical practice” of independent agencies 
being headed in the manner found in the CFPB, the court reasoned that the CFPB’s 
departure from historical administrative tradition was an indication that the structure 
violated constitutional separation of powers requirements.26 On rehearing, the court 
quickly came to the opposite conclusion on this point: acknowledging that a “con-
strained role for novelty is well justified,” the court ultimately found no precedent 
for novelty itself to render agency structure unconstitutional.27
With these facets of the PHH Corp. decisions in mind, the problems addressed 
and presented throughout the litigation are ultimately two-pronged. While the legal 
problem is fairly straightforward—whether the CFPB’s leadership structure is un-
constitutional and must be statutorily altered to fit more tried-and-true agency design 
norms—there is a secondary, and perhaps more compelling, policy problem that 
arises from this particular debate. Beyond the constitutional separation of power con-
flicts, what are the practical concerns with this kind of organizational and power 
structure—and the ability to freely tailor a government organization’s structure to 
most effectively suit its unique needs—from the viewpoint of bureaucrats and public 
managers?  
With a particular emphasis on the novelty tenet of the two PHH Corp. opinions,
Part I of this Note discusses the implications of the judicial debate over agency struc-
ture across the PHH Corp. litigation, and the relationship and compatibility of the 
courts’ reasoning with two other agency design objectives and ideals—that of poli-
cymakers in Congress, and that of leading organizational design scholars and theo-
rists. Part I also includes a supplemental discussion about the threat of agency capture 
as an inevitable and necessary concern in agency design decisions. After considera-
tion of these competing goals for administrative function and design, Part II then 
focuses on the CFPB as an illustrative case study on the clear tensions between legal 
constraints on agency structure and policy and management goals, and as an example 
of how these tensions may play out in court. These tensions indicate a clear need for 
innovation in approaches to organizational structure that promote experimentation 
and adaptability, especially in the face of crisis and change. As shown by the CFPB’s 
experience, however, these traditional structures are in need of, at the very least, per-
mission to be improved. And although the D.C. Circuit ultimately held in favor of 
this same conclusion for the CFPB, the arguments posed herein nonetheless remain 
relevant for their broader applicability in other jurisdictions and as applied to other 
federal agencies. 
                                                                                                                
26. Id. at 21–22. In separation of powers cases where the constitutional text alone pro-
vides no resolution to the matter, a court will turn to historical practice to establish the appro-
priate limits on the executive and legislative branch powers. Id. at 23. With no mention of 
administrative agencies (independent or executive), let alone their structure, in the text of the 
Constitution, the key source for the constitutional status of independent agencies is 
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, which established that it was not constitutionally of-
fensive for Congress to limit the President’s removal power over agency officials. Datla & 
Revesz, supra note 8, at 778 (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628–29
(1935)).  
27. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 102–03 (“Novelty ‘is not necessarily fatal; there is a first time 
for everything.’” (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549 (2012))).
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I. UNDERSTANDING AND RATIONALIZING COMPETING DESIGN OBJECTIVES
Following the D.C. Circuit decisions, one can identify three competing policy and 
design goals that have faced the CFPB throughout its existence thus far. First is 
Congress’s goal in creating the CFPB in the first place. Why did Congress structure 
the CFPB in the way that they did? What policy concerns underscored the need to 
distribute power and leadership in such a constitutionally precarious way? Second, 
of course, is the court’s holding and reasoning throughout the PHH Corp. litigation,
which functions now as a supplement for the design decisions of the original policy-
makers.28 Though the court eventually reached a conclusion in the most recent deci-
sion that aligns with the goals sought by Congress, this discussion will more heavily 
emphasize the holding and reasoning in the first, vacated opinion in PHH Corp. as 
an example of the arguments against the CFPB’s structure, which could become 
precedent in another circuit or regarding another agency. Third, and perhaps the per-
spective most easily overlooked, but equally crucial in conducting an accurate eval-
uation of the CFPB’s success and next steps, are current leading organizational struc-
ture and management theories, which present a framework independent of legal and 
constitutional concerns for achieving effectiveness and efficiency.29 All of these pol-
icy and design objectives are important for assessing the structural soundness of the 
CFPB (or of any other federal administrative agency for that matter). This Part will 
also address one additional consideration that arguably underlies the reasoning be-
hind each of these three competing objectives: agency capture and the desire to in-
sulate the agency from particular political or financial influences. The differing ways 
in which this consideration comes into play for different governmental actors or in-
terests, and its impact on organizational structure, are relevant for a full assessment 
of the CFPB’s efficacy.
A. Congressional Intent and the CFPB’s Formation
Formed in response to the ongoing consequences of the financial crisis of 2008,30
the CFPB was created as an independent bureau with a stated statutory purpose of 
“ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products 
                                                                                                                
28. To reiterate, I intend to focus on the pair of decisions in PHH Corp. not for the ulti-
mate holding and outcome, but for how the court got there; regardless of what happened with 
this particular case and with this particular agency, the argument I make will still have merit, 
as it is intended to apply to any agency, with the experience of the CFPB meant to highlight 
the argument’s origin and applicability. Additionally, the PHH Corp. decision sets precedent 
for only one circuit; other jurisdictions could very well adopt the views of the first opinion in 
this case, making the holding and reasoning of that first opinion even more important despite 
being reversed in this particular action. See infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.  
29. See generally RICHARD H. HALL & PAMELA S. TOLBERT, ORGANIZATIONS:
STRUCTURES, PROCESSES, AND OUTCOMES 27–62 (2005); HENRY MINTZBERG, STRUCTURE IN 
FIVES: DESIGNING EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS 1–22 (1983); HAL G. RAINEY, UNDERSTANDING 
AND MANAGING PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS 208–42 (2014).
30. See Nissim-Sabat, supra note 2, at 7 (“Congress passed [Dodd-Frank] with the dual 
aim of both providing some remedy for the harm done by the crisis and preventing another 
2008 financial crisis.”).
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and services” and ensuring that such markets are “fair, transparent, and competi-
tive.”31 As mentioned previously, however, despite being an independent agency, the 
CFPB is headed only by a single, President-appointed director, who serves an ap-
pointment term of five years and is removable only for cause by the President.32 “For-
cause” removal has not been strictly defined, but the general understanding and 
standard applied by courts is that for-cause removal limits the President’s power to 
remove the agency head only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in 
office.”33 For-cause removal shields an appointed agency director from arbitrary dis-
cipline or capricious or ill-reasoned removal by the President, such as for purely po-
litical motives.34 This contrasts with removal at will, a characteristic typical of single 
heads of executive agencies, who are directly accountable to, and whose power is 
checked by, the President.35 As a substitute for the presidential check on executive 
agency power, independent agencies thus typically employ the multimember com-
mission design element, the members of which, in theory, provide checks on each 
other’s decision-making powers.36 The single head of the CFPB possesses a rela-
tively broad range of powers and functions: he unilaterally37 enforces nineteen perti-
nent consumer protection statutes, is the sole decider of rulemaking initiatives and 
rule enforcement, and determines the sanctions against violators of the laws he en-
forces.38  
Interestingly, the CFPB as originally proposed did not possess its unusual alloca-
tion of power in the single head.39 President Obama proposed a prototype consumer 
financial protection agency in 2009 to be structured as an independent regulatory 
agency (as opposed to an executive agency) in order to preserve independence in 
decision making and accountability;40 similarly, Senator (then professor) Elizabeth 
                                                                                                                
31. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2012). 
32. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b), (c) (2012).   
33. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 620; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729 
(1986) (noting that the term “for cause” is broad, and “could sustain removal . . . for any 
number of actual or perceived transgressions”). The quoted language from Humphrey’s 
Executor is the same definition that ultimately appeared in the statute establishing the CFPB 
and its director authorities, and thus is the controlling standard for removal for the CFPB spe-
cifically. See 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3).  
34. See Verkuil, supra note 7, at 260. 
35. E.g., PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
vacated and rehearing granted by No. 15-1177, slip op. at 2 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017), 
remanded by 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
36. Id. at 6; see also Barkow, supra note 2, at 37–39 (arguing that multimember leadership 
facilitates more deliberation and debate than a single head, so long as there is an appropriate 
balance in membership between minority and majority political leanings).  
37. The court in the first PHH Corp. decision repeatedly employed the term “unilateral” 
to describe the power possessed by the CFPB director, and defined it to mean “authority to 
take action on one’s own, subject to no check.” PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 6–7.
38. Id. at 7. 
39. Id. at 15; Barkow, supra note 2, at 72; see also Pearson, supra note 19, at 103 (listing 
ways in which Congress departed from the Treasury’s and Elizabeth Warren’s initial proposals 
for a consumer protection bureau).   
40. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 58
(2009), https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/LPS113933/LPS113933/www.financialstability.gov 
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Warren’s official proposal for the CFPB in 2010 envisioned the agency as a tradi-
tional multimember independent agency.41 The form the CFPB structure ultimately 
took was the direct result of compromise between consumer advocates and policy-
makers like Warren and powerful industry groups who opposed the CFPB having 
independent and autonomous rulemaking authority.42 Aside from representing polit-
ical compromise, the final legislated structure of the CFPB also carefully accommo-
dated one other key policy goal: insulation from agency capture.43  
Generally speaking, Congress will choose to make an agency independent as a 
result of a mix of concerns regarding agency expertise, due process, and presidential 
behavior.44 Despite debates on the value of independent agencies generally,45 struc-
turing and designating a new agency as an independent one is often regarded as an 
effective way to mitigate the risk of agency capture and reduce the influence of po-
litical bias on decision making.46 Independence has also been cited as especially nec-
essary in financial regulation.47 Part of the motive behind Dodd-Frank and the inde-
pendence mechanisms it granted the CFPB was to keep the agency independent from 
other branches of government, but also, crucially, to keep it independent from the 
special interests of a powerful and aggressive financial services industry; independ-
ence was intended as a means of upholding the CFPB’s mission of protecting 
American consumers.48 And while the first opinion in PHH Corp. claimed that 
Congress merely “stumbled” into the structure it chose for the CFPB without any 
clear reason beyond political compromise,49 many more compelling arguments have 
                                                                                                                
/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/PRC7-93YR]; Barkow, supra note 2, at 27. 
41. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J. (2007), https:// 
democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate [https://perma.cc/V6S5-RXEC]. A 
House Bill backed by Congressman Barney Frank and Speaker Nancy Pelosi also featured a 
consumer protection agency with a multimember, independent form. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. 
§ 1103 (as passed by House, Dec. 11, 2009). 
42. See Barkow, supra note 2, at 74; cf. Pearson, supra note 19, at 103 (stating that the 
departures from the initial proposals for the agency’s powers and structures were meant to 
guard against agency capture).  
43. See Pearson, supra note 19, at 103. 
44. Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization 
and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 463 (2008).  
45. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
46. See Michael S. Barr, Accountability and Independence in Financial Regulation: 
Checks and Balances, Public Engagement, and Other Innovations, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
119, 119 (2015); see also Barkow, supra note 2, at 21 (“To achieve either expert or nonpartisan 
decision making, one must avoid undue industry influence, or ‘capture.’”).  
47. Contra Gillian E. Metzger, Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Reflection: The 
Evolving Relationship Between Administrative Law and Financial Regulation, 78 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 130 (2015) (arguing that where most agencies are structured based on 
fears of agency capture, in the financial regulation sphere, “the defining structural precept is 
not accountability but independence,” and that instead of guarding against capture, many fi-
nancial regulatory agencies instead seem to be more susceptible to it). 
48. Nissim-Sabat, supra note 2, at 2.  
49. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated 
and rehearing granted by No. 15-1177, slip op. at 2 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017), remanded by 
881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
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been put forth that a single administrator, rather than a multimember board, is indeed 
a more appropriate leadership form for the CFPB.50 It is not unreasonable, then, to 
think Congress may have chosen such a form based on deliberate and careful reasons, 
as opposed to the final form being no more than a lowest-common-denominator so-
lution.51
B. D.C. Circuit’s Reasoning in PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau 
Although the first opinion in PHH Corp. was vacated by the court on rehearing, 
the opinion is nonetheless very thorough in its presentation of potential arguments 
against the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure. The first opinion therefore pro-
vides very useful template for the kinds of arguments that may very well be—and, 
in fact, already have been52—made in future actions in other courts regarding the 
CFPB’s structure, and is therefore worthy of closer consideration. 
Per the D.C. Circuit’s original determination that the formation of the CFPB was 
unconstitutional, the CFPB was ordered to restructure, which meant that, in order to 
remain operational, the relevant for-cause removal provision of the governing statute 
was to be severed from the rest of the establishing law, leaving the CFPB as a tradi-
tional executive agency with a single head who would then otherwise be subject to 
at-will removal by the President.53 This action was deemed a necessary response to 
what the court determined was a violation of Article II of the Constitution.54 The 
court reached that conclusion by heavily relying on the novelty of the CFPB’s struc-
ture as persuasive evidence that the CFPB leadership should not withstand a consti-
tutional challenge.55  
                                                                                                                
50. See PHH Corp, 881 F.3d at 91 (“Financial regulation, in particular, has long been 
thought to be well served by a degree of independence.”); Nissim-Sabat, supra note 2, at 14–
15 (describing accessibility by consumer groups, avoidance of political gridlock, stability, and 
accountability as benefits to a single-leader structure over a multimember board). Nissim-
Sabat also cites efficiency in decision making as an additional benefit, and one that also helps 
prevent capture by the industry. Id. at 25 (“Because a single director will be able to make more 
efficient decisions than a board of commissioners, the CFPB’s structure will enable it to pro-
mote consumers’ interests.”).
51. In fact, a 2011 bill proposed altering the CFPB’s structure to a multimember commis-
sion. H.R. REP. NO. 112-107, at 4–5 (2011). Although Elizabeth Warren originally advocated 
the multimember structure in her first proposal for the CFPB, she actually responded to the 
2011 bill with a defense of the benefits of the single head. Nissim-Sabat, supra note 2, at 26–
27 (citing Oversight of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Services, 112th Cong. 
40 (2011) (statement of Elizabeth Warren, Special Advisor to the Sec’y of the Treasury for 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury). Warren’s defense of 
the single head and the fact that the proposal did not pass further suggests that Congress leg-
islated the new agency power structure with full awareness of the pros and cons of doing so. 
52. See infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.  
53. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 8.  
54. Id.
55. See supra notes 4–5, 21–26 and accompanying text. 
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To further rationalize the court’s reasoning, it is important to recognize that Judge 
Kavanaugh, author of the majority opinion, is not only a notably conservative judge, 
but also a separation of powers specialist.56 Because the constitutionality of the CFPB 
has been contested in and out of the court room since the agency’s birth,57 the issues 
in PHH Corp. would inevitably undergo judicial scrutiny at some point,58 but not 
necessarily by a panel with Kavanaugh, meaning the decision just as easily could 
have gone the opposite direction.59
It is also worth considering, though not discussed as part of the court’s analysis,
that statutory limitations on presidential removal and appointment powers are quite 
effective in protecting officials from a President’s influence when the directing offi-
cial and the President are of opposing political parties.60 Although President Obama 
(who was President at the time of the CFPB’s formation) and the CFPB’s first direc-
tor Richard Cordray were both part of the Democratic Party, it is certainly plausible 
that Congress set the removal powers as they did in order to protect the director from 
a future President of the opposite political party—such as President Trump—and that 
Judge Kavanaugh, as a conservative, felt such protection was unwarranted. 
Kavanaugh also briefly touches on the issue of agency capture, arguing that a multi-
member agency is better protected from capture by the industry and interest groups 
than a single head would be, simply because one person is more easily and quickly 
influenced than a group of people.61
                                                                                                                
56. Alison Frankel, The D.C. Circuit’s Gratuitous Ruling on CFPB Constitutionality,
REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2016), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2016/10/11/the-d-c-circuits-
gratuitous-ruling-on-cfpb-constitutionality [https://perma.cc/GH4R-RLNN]. Kavanaugh, of 
course, later became President Trump’s second Supreme Court nominee and was sworn in in 
October 2018. E.g., Brian Naylor, Brett Kavanaugh Sworn in as Newest Supreme Court 
Justice, NPR (Oct. 6, 2018, 7:00 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/06/654409999/final-
senate-vote-on-kavanaugh-nomination-expected-saturday [https://perma.cc/6HB2-FD7W].
57. See supra notes 2, 15–18 and accompanying text.  
58. While the CFPB has suffered other attacks on its constitutionality, this was by far the 
most serious challenge, and was the first challenge to the CFPB’s enforcement powers. Eric J. 
Mogilnicki & David A. Stein, DC Circ. Single-Director Ruling Clips CFPB’s Wings, LAW360
(Oct. 14, 2016, 5:31 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/851887/dc-circ-single-director-
ruling-clips-cfpb-s-wings [https://perma.cc/G9ZZ-ZTW5]. In its challenge to the CFPB’s 
power and enforcement, PHH argued that the alleged constitutional violation warranted a com-
plete dismantling of the CFPB, as well as invalidation of the entire Dodd-Frank Act. PHH
Corp, 839 F.3d at 8.  
59. Frankel, supra note 56; cf. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 56–57 (Henderson, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the constitutional issue did not even need to be 
reached to resolve the case and issue a remedy). This also illustrates the uncertainty around 
how courts in other jurisdictions outside the D.C. Circuit may resolve issues around the 
CFPB’s structure. 
60. Devins & Lewis, supra note 44, at 460–61. 
61. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 28 (citing Barkow, supra note 2, at 38). This is in direct 
contrast to the arguments put forth by Nissim-Sabat and Warren on the advantages of a multi-
member leadership board. See supra note 51. Agency capture concerns are discussed in more 
detail in Part I.D. 
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Regardless of the court’s political leanings and questions of capture, there is a 
curious tension here: if the CFPB’s structure poses even a potential threat to individ-
ual liberty (in the eyes of Kavanaugh and potentially other circuits), how did 
Congress come to the conclusion that the very same structure was necessary not only 
to strike a bargain between competing political views, but also to protect the public 
interest in the realm of consumer protection? Examination of a third set of policy 
perspectives—foundational theories of organizational structure and function—may 
help shed light on the tensions between congressional policy choices and judicial 
debates on the CFPB’s structure and on the structure of government agencies more 
generally.
C. Basic Tenets of Leading Organizational Design Theories 
Management-oriented theories on organizational structure problems and goals 
provide a key foundation for evaluating the sort of structural predicament faced by 
the CFPB. Without first understanding these basic social ideologies on how any or-
ganization, private or public,62 should function, accommodating legal constraints and 
precedents within an organization’s structure is a much more abstract and impractical 
endeavor.  
For starters, the core definition of the term “structure” in the organizational con-
text, when used by management and organizational theorists, typically means “the 
configuration of the hierarchical levels and specialized units and positions within an 
organization and the formal rules governing these arrangements.”63 The structure and 
design of any organization is heavily influenced by an amalgam of factors, including 
but not limited to environmental complexity, public or private sector status, goals, 
and leadership.64 Though public organizations are not generally regarded as distinct 
entities when it comes to developing and applying an organizational design theory,65
the one key difference is the obvious fact that the organization or agency, as a gov-
ernment entity, is necessarily more heavily influenced by and answerable to other 
governmental and political actors.66  
According to Richard Hall and Pamela Tolbert, the structure of a properly de-
signed organization should serve three basic functions: (1) produce outputs and 
                                                                                                                
62. The prevailing consensus among organizational theorists is that concepts of structure 
apply equally to private and public organizations, and that attempts to differentiate between 
the two rely on simplified assumptions and meaningless stereotypes. RAINEY, supra note 29,
at 212.  
63. Id. at 211. 
64. Id.  
65. See supra note 62. 
66. Rainey gives several examples of ways such actors can influence a public organiza-
tion’s structure and design: legislation, political pressure (to force changes to structure—such 
as in the PHH Corp. decisions), rules and clearances set by oversight agencies for other man-
agers, congressional micromanagement in the form of complex legislation for rules and struc-
ture, interest group pressure on legislators and agencies alike, and altering of federal civil ser-
vice hierarchies. RAINEY, supra note 29, at 213.  
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achieve goals; (2) minimize individual variations and responses within an organiza-
tion; and (3) create a setting in which power is exercised and decisions are made.67
These three functions parallel, or at least align with, the five coordinating mecha-
nisms Henry Mintzberg outlines as integral in the internal coordination of tasks 
within the organization: mutual adjustment, direct supervision, standardization of 
work process, standardization of output, and standardization of employee skills.68
Mutual adjustment refers to the informal process of continual adaptation and devel-
opment of knowledge as the work progresses among specialists in the organization, 
ultimately working towards achievement of Hall and Tolbert’s first function of or-
ganizational outcomes.69 Direct supervision is fairly self-explanatory, referring to 
coordination to achieve outcomes via one person having direct power and control 
over another—this control, then, can be seen as a form of all three of Hall and 
Tolbert’s functions.70 The three standardization mechanisms clearly mirror the min-
imization of variation function; each entails set programming of various procedures 
or requirements in order to increase effectiveness by eliminating variation in those 
processes.71  
Mintzberg posits that all five of the coordinating mechanisms are typically inter-
mingled and simultaneously present within a given organization, but that often cer-
tain mechanisms become more favored and more effective as an organization be-
comes more complex, moving first from mutual adjustment, then to direct 
supervision, and on to standardization (with standardization of processes being pref-
erable to standardization of outputs, and standardization of outputs preferable to 
standardization of skills).72 Importantly, however, the distribution and use of these 
mechanisms, along with other features of organizational design, such as centraliza-
tion, formalization, and complexity,73 will vary based on the context in which the 
organization is situated. Under such a contingency model there is arguably “no one 
best way to organize.”74
Even just based on these very basic and unelaborated tenets of organizational de-
sign theory, one can extract relevant components of both congressional policy 
choices and the D.C. Circuit’s decisions on the CFPB’s structure that are clearly 
compatible with these core principles of organizational theory. This is true even 
though neither the court nor Congress explicitly refers to the social science and man-
agerial approach, drawing their conclusions instead from a set of strictly legal prin-
ciples. It should first be noted that the CFPB, because it is part of a larger govern-
mental network of organizations and powers, and because it derives its authority and 
procedures primarily from legislated terms, has a high degree of complexity and for-
malization.75 The court, in its vacated order for the CFPB to sever the for-cause pro-
vision and restructure accordingly, places a clear policy emphasis on the need for 
                                                                                                                
67. HALL & TOLBERT, supra note 29, at 30. 
68. MINTZBERG, supra note 29, at 4–6.
69. Id. at 4.  
70. See id. 
71. See id. at 5–6; see also HALL & TOLBERT, supra note 29, at 30.  
72. MINTZBERG, supra note 29, at 7.  
73. HALL & TOLBERT, supra note 29.
74. Id. at 42.; RAINEY, supra note 29, at 215.  
75. See HALL & TOLBERT, supra note 29, at 32, 45 (defining complexity as an element 
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standardization of process: the function of the agency should match the standard of 
agency design traditionally employed in the federal government. The court’s ordered 
severance also emphasized the need for direct supervision, as illustrated by the pre-
dominant concern with the lack of any check on the CFPB director’s authority.
Importantly, the final decision in the case on rehearing emphasized these elements 
as well, just less directly, because the court instead thought such attributes were al-
ready sufficiently present in the CFPB’s structure. 
Congress, on the other hand, may very well have taken a sort of contingency 
model76 into account when deciding to form the CFPB’s structure in a way that de-
parts from long-accepted standards and supervisory controls. Contingency theory is 
a popular approach to effective leadership in public organizations, and refers to an 
approach that rejects a “one best way” type of leadership and instead emphasizes a 
correlation between leadership style and organizational environment; a leader’s ef-
fectiveness is highly dependent upon context.77 This same idea can easily be applied 
to a leadership structure or hierarchy of power in an organization—just as there is 
arguably no one strict formula for what leadership style is most effective, there is 
certainly no one set model for organizational structure that can prove most effective 
without consideration of context.78  
Because the CFPB was created to combat some of the ills of the national financial 
crisis at the time,79 legislators and policymakers possibly saw an opportunity to take 
some innovative liberties in how they structured the CFPB.80 Perhaps, based on some 
                                                                                                                
identifiable by things like divisions of labor, job titles, high numbers of divisions or depart-
ments, and a clear and large hierarchy, and defining formalization as the extent to which rules 
and procedures govern the workplace). For a general and graphical overview of the CFPB 
hierarchy, see Bureau Structure, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www 
.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure [https://perma.cc/96H4-4L5F] 
(last updated Aug. 8, 2018). This graphic is actually somewhat misleading in its arrangement. 
While there is a definite hierarchy in place with acting director Mick Mulvaney possessing 
direct control at the organizational apex over the remaining divisions, upon closer look at the 
diagram, the flow of command does not actually appear to continue downward through levels 
of vertical differentiation, even though the diagram lists the divisions in a top-down manner. 
See id. Rather, it appears that all of the different divisions on the left and offices under the 
director on the right actually exhibit a high degree of horizontal differentiation, or different 
specialized tasks that do not necessarily occupy a hierarchical order outside of sitting below 
the director. See id.; see also HALL & TOLBERT, supra note 29, at 34 (defining horizontal 
differentiation).  
76. See RAINEY, supra note 29, at 338–40 (summarizing Fielder’s contingency theory of 
leadership).  
77. See id.
78. See id. at 215 (describing that contingency theorists in the mid-twentieth century did 
in fact apply the contingency model to arguments for adapting an organization’s structure). 
79. Nissim-Sabat, supra note 2, at 3–7.  
80. While theorists’ approach to the study of organizational structure and design may not 
differ for public versus private organizations, Rainey does concede that, once formed, public 
organizations inevitably are more rigid, hierarchical, formalized, and centralized. RAINEY,
supra note 29, at 233–38. Rainey attributes this trend to the lack of performance indicators
like profit and sales found in the private sector, which forces government organizations to 
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policymakers’ expertise in banking and consumer protection, Congress reasoned that 
the economic context warranted the exact departure from historical standards that the 
D.C. Circuit would later initially try to condemn because the context itself was un-
precedented. Consider the proliferation of governmental agencies and expansion of 
the bureaucracy during the New Deal era under President Roosevelt.81 Several of 
those agencies were unprecedented in both power and subject matter, but the inno-
vation and experimentation in their creation was necessary to combat longer-term 
effects of the Great Depression and to help the country’s economy recover.82 Was a 
similar situation faced by the Congress that enacted Dodd-Frank and created the 
CFPB in the midst of the financial crisis? Yes. But, the judicial exchange seen in 
PHH Corp.—which, though it resolved favorably, initially shuttered the possibility 
of experimentation even in the face of crisis and dynamic change—serves primarily 
as a warning that other circuits, or litigation over other agencies, may very easily 
come to the same conclusion as the first PHH Corp. opinion. In fact, at least one 
opinion since the end of the PHH Corp. litigation has already done so: Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, Inc.,83 has already held that the 
CFPB lacked authority to bring an enforcement action at all because it was unconsti-
tutionally structured with the single head removable only for cause.84 As such, the 
possibility of experimentation with agency form still remains very much at risk.
D. Another Looming Consideration: Agency Capture 
In addition to the very foundational organizational design considerations, the pol-
icymakers behind the creation of the CFPB likely had other pressing concerns that 
motivated the controversial structure decisions. Because the reasoning and legisla-
tive history behind the Dodd-Frank Act and the for-cause removal provision is rela-
tively sparse, much of the policy considerations underlying the structure provisions 
are only inferable or available from other secondary scholarship.85 Even so, there is 
                                                                                                                
instead emphasize rules and hierarchy. Id. at 233. Given the discussion in PHH Corp., how-
ever, it is also evident that the governmental emphasis on tradition and reluctance to embrace 
reform is also a key contributor.  
81. See RAINEY, supra note 29, at 215; Datla & Revesz, supra note 8, at 771 n.2 (listing 
examples of agencies formed in the wake of the New Deal). 
82. See 32 CHARLES H. KOCH, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 8113 (1st ed., Apr. 
update 2016). 
83. 2018 WL 3094916 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2018). 
84. Id. at *36. 
85. The court in PHH Corp. wrote that the single director choice for the CFPB was not a 
very “legislative” decision and that there was no record of committee reports or other legisla-
tive history to shed light on the choice and the benefits of a single-director independent agency 
over a multimember one. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 35 (D.C. Cir. 
2016), vacated and rehearing granted by No. 15-1177, slip op. at 2 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017), 
remanded by 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018). As discussed previously in this Note, however, 
contrasting arguments in favor of independence have been put forth. See supra notes 50–51.
Michael S. Barr, a key architect of Dodd-Frank, wrote about the many goals of Dodd-Frank, 
which included improving the interactions and coordination of regulators, responses to prob-
lems, assessment and collecting of information, and public accountability. Barr, supra note 
46, at 123. The legislative record may be lacking, but if these truly were some of the main 
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a strong argument that one of the more implicit concerns of policymakers was de-
signing the CFPB in a way that avoided agency “capture,” or “undue industry influ-
ence,” on the agency’s decision making.86 Capture is an ever-present concern for any 
governmental regulatory agency87 and is not a concern unique to independent agen-
cies.88 It typically occurs when an agency, working and developing close relation-
ships with the industry it regulates, veers from its regulatory mission to instead share 
the goals of the industry, resulting in a surrender to the very industry it was meant to 
regulate: enforcement becomes lax and the agency emphasizes industry interests over 
promotion of best public policy.89 The call for a separation of political and special 
interest pressures originates in the late eighteenth-century Progressive era reform ef-
forts to rid the government of both corruption and the tendency to cater to special 
private and political interests.90
Because under-enforcement is such a dominant problem in financial regulation,91
the CFPB provides a particularly illustrative example of a regulatory context in 
which powerful industry influence opposes the agency’s public interest goals and the 
threat of capture is especially prominent.92 Indeed, in structuring the CFPB so that it 
could most effectively implement its mission of protecting consumers,93 the design-
ers of the CFPB saw capture as one of the key concerns, cautioning that “agency 
capture was the ‘main regulatory design challenge.’”94
                                                                                                                
considerations going into Dodd-Frank, then it seems apparent that the leadership provisions 
were, at the very least, not some kind of accident or careless move.  
86. Barkow, supra note 2, at 22 (explaining that this kind of disproportionate influence 
from the regulated industry or powerful interest groups inevitably causes “persistent policy 
bias in favor of these interests”).
87. Nissim-Sabat, supra note 2, at 3. 
88. Datla & Revesz, supra note 8, at 771.  
89. Nissim-Sabat, supra note 2, at 10. Once capture has happened, the government fails 
to represent the majority. Id. at 11 (citing WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM: A CALL 
FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF THE GENEROUS ENERGIES OF A PEOPLE 201–02 (1st ed. 1913)). 
90. See RAINEY, supra note 29, at 25. In his famed essay, The Study of Administration,
Woodrow Wilson advocated a total separation of politics and administration. Woodrow 
Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 210 (1887). 
91. See Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1129, 1139–40 (2016). The prevalence of the threat of capture is due to the financial firms in 
the regulated industry being so well financed and well organized, making it difficult to enforce 
financial regulation laws to the extent they should be. Id. When the first order in PHH Corp. 
was issued, many argued the decision would only make effective enforcement even more dif-
ficult for the CFPB, but not on the basis of the constitutional part of the holding. See Evan 
Weinberger, D.C. Circ. Single-Director Ruling May Hinder CFPB Enforcement, LAW360
(Oct. 12, 2016, 6:57 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/850602/dc-circ-single-director-
ruling-may-hinder-cfpb-enforcement [https://perma.cc/26AW-77L2].
92. Barkow, supra note 2, at 65 (“[C]onsumer protection agencies tend to be less likely 
to worry about satisfying consumer groups than the more powerful regulated industries . . . 
creat[ing] the ideal breeding ground for agency capture and one-sided political pressure.”).
93. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2012). 
94. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 17, at 1487 (quoting Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth 
Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 99 n.325 (2008)).   
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But how does agency capture relate to the internal structure of the agency? The 
answer lies in the distinguishing features of independent agencies versus executive 
agencies: by building independence from the executive into the agency’s structure, 
policymakers insulate, via organizational design and allocations of authority, the 
agency from capture by the regulated entities.95 This structural buffer actually miti-
gates the effects of two distinct types of capture—capture by the regulated industry, 
which can exert powerful influence on the agency head themselves or via lobbying 
powers on Congress and policymakers, as well as capture by the President or other 
political forces in the other branches.96 Recall the discussion in Part I.A about the 
definition of for-cause removal typical of independent agency heads. If an agency is 
created as an independent agency, the President can remove the head only for objec-
tive indicators of poor performance like negligence and malfeasance—the President 
cannot, however, opt for removal of an independent agency head merely because of 
disagreements or changes in policy objectives.97 Thus, independence of the agency 
enables deflection of influence from multiple partisan sources, and the goal of such 
independence is ultimately to allow the agency to act more consistently in line with 
its stated policy objectives and the general public interest.98  
While this explanation provides only surface-level insight into the motivations 
behind establishing public interest agencies as independent, it is nonetheless helpful 
in understanding and outlining just one possible supplement to the reasoning of both 
Congress and the D.C. Circuit in addressing their competing concerns over the 
CFPB’s structure, and over how to achieve the CFPB’s consumer protection goals 
via that structure without infringing on any constitutional limits. Such limits may 
include those on the scope of executive power under Article II, or the those on the 
liberty of the individual, who may be harmed more greatly if the agency does fall 
prey to capture (either by the executive or the industry) and has unchecked decision-
making authority.  
II. A NEED FOR ADAPTIVE AND INCREMENTAL APPROACHES TO AGENCY DESIGN
To bridge the divide between (1) the arguments for adherence to history and tra-
dition, as highlighted in the first PHH Corp. decision, as a means of constructing a 
                                                                                                                
95. Barkow, supra note 2, at 22–24.  
96. Id.; see also Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2378 (2006) (“[T]he hope of reestablishing a more politi-
cally independent bureaucracy remains an influential countercurrent in the law, theory, and 
practice of administration.”).
97. Barkow, supra note 2, at 27–28.  
98. Id. at 19 (“What policy makers who seek insulation want to avoid are particular pit-
falls of politicization, such as pressures that prioritize narrow short-term interests at the ex-
pense of long-term public welfare.”). Statutory grants of power are not the only way independ-
ence can be achieved through cultural or social mechanisms, such as emphasizing professional 
expertise within the administrative agency, and fostering public acceptance that such expertise 
increases the accountability of bureaucrats when put under the pressures of politicians and 
industry groups. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 96, at 2379. For a discussion of how the 
judiciary may also play a role in the prevention of capture, see Thomas W. Merrill, Capture 
Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997). 
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seemingly impenetrable barrier to experimentation and innovation in agency leader-
ship and design,99 and (2) congressional and organizational theorist ideals that advo-
cate for the opposite, this Note proposes consideration of a new adaptive organiza-
tional design approach. Specific to the governmental context, an approach that allows 
first for flexibility in initial design, and then for incremental alteration of structure 
once formed, would be most effective in allowing an agency to implement and en-
force its statutory mission regardless of the economic, political, or social circum-
stances,100 and would allow continually developing accommodations between the 
many competing interests going into the formulation and review of an agency. 
While there are clear alignments of the policy objectives sought in the design 
mandates of Congress, the D.C. Circuit, and traditional organizational theorists,101
there still is a wide gap in the applicability of the latter to governmental agency 
forms. Particularly in regards to the novelty tenet of the court’s holding, how can 
governmental agencies really hope to adapt, grow, and improve if a court might rep-
rimand them for departing from established (but perhaps ineffective) agency struc-
tures? Where the studies on structure fall short is in their broadness: in order to better 
advise an agency like the CFPB—which, upon creation, faced a unique and urgent 
public interest goal—on how to best structure their internal divisions and coordina-
tion of tasks, it is of utmost importance to be able to reference studies that integrate 
constitutional limitations into their evaluations and conclusions. Without reference 
to any kind of legal norms or bounds, studies like those from Mintzberg and Hall and 
Tolbert are necessarily limited in their compatibility with an incredibly large and 
powerful segment of organizations—the federal government.  
This necessarily begs the question: if compatibility between design theory and 
legal tradition is low or limited,102 then is there really anything that can be done to 
improve organizational structures in the federal government—be it for lack of effi-
ciency, accountability concerns, improved performance, or any other number of rea-
sons—without at least risking a constitutional breach? 
The need for administrative and government reform and reorganization is by no 
means a new proposal. Presidents and presidential candidates frequently propose 
some form of government reorganization as part of their campaign platform.103 In 
                                                                                                                
99. Anticipating an argument that the CFPB’s unique structure should be allowed as a 
congressional experiment, the court in the first PHH Corp. wrote that it “cannot think of this 
as a one-off case because [it] could not cabin the consequences in any principled manner if [it] 
were to uphold the CFPB’s single-Director structure.” PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  
100. See, e.g., RAINEY, supra note 29, at 56 (listing some contingencies affecting organi-
zational structure and function).  
101. See supra Part I.C.  
102. Cf. Verkuil, supra note 7, at 267 (suggesting there is a “mismatch” between organi-
zational form and statutory decision-making functions agencies are assigned). 
103. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 17, at 1450. In the case of the CFPB specifically, 
President Trump repeatedly stated during the 2016 presidential campaign that he intended to 
reduce the CFPB’s authority or get rid of the agency entirely as part of his pro-business, 
antiregulation platform. Donna Borak & Henry Williams, Clinton vs. Trump: Where They 
Stand on Wall Street, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2016, 5:00 PM), http://graphics.wsj.com/elections 
/2016/where-do-clinton-and-trump-stand-on-wall-street [https://perma.cc/EQ57-4NMP] (cit-
ing numerous news interviews and public statements made by Trump during his campaign 
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2003, the National Commission on the Public Service issued an extensive report with 
a series of enumerated recommendations for improving the organization, operations, 
and leadership of the federal government, and that at least some revitalization needed 
to occur as soon as possible, warning that the government otherwise would face “cri-
sis after crisis,” and still be unable to handle the consequences effectively and with 
the trust of the people.104 Much legal scholarship has also been devoted to proposals 
for reform, or at least assessment, of government or agency structures, and many of 
those proposals include some form of increased flexibility or advocate contextual 
considerations as part of the proposed criteria.105  
The bulk of these proposals and analyses, however, by focusing on either creating 
a new multipart framework for what factors to consider in agency design, or focusing 
on agency design only in one specific regulatory context, are too narrow to accom-
modate the broader reforms for which this Note has identified a need. And for pro-
posals that are intended to apply to agencies more generally, those too are limited in 
their usefulness by a failure to account for constitutional constraints,106 a failure that 
                                                                                                                
regarding financial regulation and the CFPB); see also Michelle Singletary, Trump’s Election 
Does Not Bode Well for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/get-there/trumps-election-does-not-bode-
well-for-the-consumer-financial-protection-bureau/2016/11/15/70618360-ab48-11e6-977a-
1030f822fc35_story.html [https://perma.cc/V345-9NJQ] (“Trump hasn’t provided specifics 
on any meaningful policies that would protect consumers. And it’s clear why. He’s aggres-
sively pro-business, a stance that far too often is at odds with consumer protection.”). Trump 
appears to be following through with these promises—or at the very least, is keeping the con-
versation alive. See Marcy Gordon, Trump Administration Looks To Curb CFPB Powers, 
Change Bank Rules, USA TODAY (June 12, 2017, 7:45 PM), https://www.usatoday.com 
/story/money/2017/06/12/trump-administration-looks-curb-cfpb-powers-change-bank-rules 
/102795120 [https://perma.cc/E5ZY-WX47].
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maintaining a constitutional balance and separation of powers). 
106. See, e.g., Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 17. Hyman and Kovacic walk the CFPB 
through their seven criteria and score the agency accordingly, but because they do not take 
any constitutional or other legal constraints into much consideration, the framework is limited 
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seems even more risky in light of the debate seen in PHH Corp. and played out in 
other courts since then.107  
These proposals unfortunately amount to yet another “one best way” solution to 
organizational design, whose factor- and element-based approaches, while touted as 
promoting flexibility, ultimately amount to another unbending formula. Instead, this 
Note suggests an adaptive approach that borrows theories about adaptive and incre-
mental decision making and applies them to organizational structure.  
Incrementalism is an approach commonly employed in governmental decision-
making processes.108 Under this approach, decision making and policy making is ac-
complished via a series of smaller-impact decisions,109 each of which institutes only 
modest change.110 This approach recognizes the many constraints faced by public 
agencies when trying to find the best single and over-arching policy solution for a 
problem—mainly, that because policymakers often disagree strongly on policy goals 
and have a hard time defining them, the policy ultimately selected may not be the 
most effective one, and instead may just be a lowest-common-denominator choice.111
Because of this problem, policy making may not ever be based on a truly compre-
hensive analysis.112 Incremental decision-making processes combat that problem too 
by taking a more step-by-step approach that enables those disagreements to exist and 
later be adapted to, rather than entirely impede an effective decision.113  
If this kind of approach were transferred to the processes determining and influ-
encing organizational structure, a better balance could at last be struck between the 
types of competing interests described in Part I. Despite the recognition by many that 
experimentation should be allowed in organizational structure,114 and that one size 
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114. See REVITALIZING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 104, at 7–8; Roberta 
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does not necessarily fit all,115 there appears to be no approach—and certainly none 
that have been implemented—applying the incremental or adaptive methods found 
in decision-making theory to administrative structure. There is no guaranteed risk of 
violating separation of powers mandates; and if any experimentation with or adapta-
tion of the organization’s structure by Congress ever does seem suspect, the other 
branches and governmental actors will still be able to provide a check on and review 
of the agency’s constitutionality, much like the court did in PHH Corp. To the con-
trary, a threat to checks and balances can in and of itself necessitate implementation 
of new institutional forms.116  
CONCLUSION
 A review of the underlying motives and reasoning for three different perspectives 
on a sample agency’s structure demonstrates that there are certainly overlapping 
trends and themes, and these overlaps are surely present even outside of the CFPB 
context and in administrative design more generally.117 A more pressing issue, how-
ever, lies where these perspectives diverge: in the push for flexibility and in the law 
and tradition potentially preventing it.
Even with the final opinion in PHH Corp. veering away from the court’s previ-
ously heavy reliance on and renewed emphasis of history and tradition as promoters 
of structural rigidity, it still seems fairly likely that courts in other jurisdictions re-
viewing a new (and perhaps improved) structure of an agency designed by Congress 
would view that newness and experimentation unfavorably. Regardless of the subse-
quent history of the PHH Corp. case specifically, and even beyond the context of the 
CFPB, the proposal in this Note for designing agencies with increased capability to 
adapt to changing circumstances remains worthy of consideration. This Note urges 
no sweeping reform, but merely an allowance of novelty in agency design such that 
it no longer potentially serves as an automatic discount to the agency’s constitution-
ality.118  The Constitution may require maintaining separation of powers and proper 
checks and balances, but it does not require an inflexible and unadaptable framework 
for doing so.  
                                                                                                                
being made necessarily means that decisions on government reorganization may not involve 
all the answers or even the correct ones, but that something nonetheless needs to be done, and 
a better answer can be continually found in the future; this is directly analogous to the pro-
cesses seen in incremental decision making. See REVITALIZING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,
supra note 104, at 34.
115. REVITALIZING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 104, at 7–8.  
116. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 96, at 2376 (describing how this occurred during 
Reconstruction following the Civil War). Or perhaps an additional change is needed not just 
in the institutional forms, but in how one categorizes them. Datla and Revesz advocate aban-
doning a binary view of agencies as two distinct categories of independent and executive, and 
instead viewing agency form as a continuum, “ranging from most independent from presiden-
tial influence to least independent.” Datla & Revesz, supra note 8, at 773. 
117. See supra Part I.C. 
118. This is not to say that the tradition and history of agency structure should be com-
pletely abandoned, but only that it should be informative, rather than controlling. See Verkuil, 
supra note 7, at 267 (“There are undoubtedly good historical reasons why [] agencies evolved 
to their present state, but that should not bar a reconceptualization of their role.”). 
